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Abstract  
Though shared custody arrangements after divorce are more and more 
frequent  in many count r ies, lit t le is known about  their  econom ic 
consequences for parents. By relaxing fam ily t ime const raints, does shared 
custody help divorced mothers return to work more easily? This art icle 
analyses to what  extent  the type of child custody arrangement  affects 
mothers’ labour market  behaviours after divorce. Using a large sample of 
divorcees from an exhaust ive French adm inist rat ive income- tax database, 
and taking advantage of the huge terr itor ial discrepancies observed in the 
proport ion of shared custody, we correct  for the possible endogeneity of 
shared custody. As it  turns out , the probability of being employed is 16 
percentage points higher for mothers with shared custody arrangements 
compared to those having sole physical custody, with huge heterogeneous 
effects:  larger posit ive effects are observed for previously inact ive women, 
for those belonging to the lowest  incom e quint iles before divorce, for those 
with a young child, and for those who have three or more children. Shared 
custody is part icular ly helpful for women who are far removed from the 
labour market .   
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1 . I nt roduct ion 
The proport ion of parents who divide about  equally the t ime spent  with 
their  children after separat ion – that  is to say, they adopt  a shared physical 
custody arrangement 1 – has substant ially increased in many count r ies 
(Cancian et  al.  2014) , though sole custody with the mother remains the 
most  frequent  arrangement  after divorce. I n Sweden and Norway for 
instance, more than 30%  of children in separated fam ilies current ly have 
shared residence2. Though cross-nat ional comparisons are complex and 
should be considered with caut ious3, the proport ion of recent  divorces with 
shared custody arrangements reaches one out  of five separat ions in many 
European count r ies such as France (19% ), the Netherlands (22% ), and 
almost  one third of divorces in Spain (28% ) and in Belgium  (33% ) 4. 
Pr imarily exercised by a small selected group of socio-econom ic 
advantaged separated parents, shared custody is now com m only used, and 
fam ilies are more diverse (Meyer et  al., 2017, Kit terød and Wiik, 2017) . 
More frequent  joint  custody arrangem ents m ight  be linked to changing 
parent ing norms:  responsibilit ies are shared more often, and fathers are 
more willing to be involved in their  children’s educat ion. New laws 
promot ing co-parent ing encourage parents to share equally their  parental 
responsibilit ies and t ime spent  with children after their  separat ion. I n 
several European count r ies (Spijker and Solsona, 2016)  and US5, init iat ives 
have been launched and im plemented to make joint  physical custody the 
default  or legally presumed post -divorce arrangement . By promot ing an 
egalitar ian policy toward the t ime spent  with both parents, the object ive is 
                                    
1 
 By shared custody, we refer here to child physical custody or shared 
residency. I n the French context , it  means an equal (or roughly)  div ision of 
t ime spent  by the child with each parent . One should not  confuse with 
shared (or j oint )  legal custody which gives parents only the r ights to 
decisions about  children’s mat ters (health, educat ion, property) .   
2  See Stat ist ics Sweden (2014)  for Sweden and Kit terød and Wiik (2017)  for  
Norway. 
3  Definit ions, shared- t ime parent ing thresholds ( t ime spent  by the child with 
each parent  may range from at  least  25%  to 50% ) , units of analysis (at  the 
children’s or divorce’s level) , measures ( incidence or prevalence)  and data 
sources (surveys, court  data)  may be different  across count r ies (Smyth, 
2017) . 
4  See Guillonneau and Moreau (2013)  for France;  Poortman and van Gaalen 
(2017)  for the Netherlands;  Solsona and Ajenjo (2017)  for Spain and 
Sodermans et  al. (2013a)  or Sodermans et  al. (2013b)  for Belgium.   
5
  The Washington post  pointed that  “ 25 US states in 2017 considered laws to 
promote shared custody of children after divorce”  
ht tps: / / www.washingtonpost .com/ local/ social- issues/ more- than-20-
states- in-2017-considered- laws- to-promote-shared-custody-of-children-
after-divorce/ 2017/ 12/ 11/ d924b938-c4b7-11e7-84bc-
5e285c7f4512_story.htm l?utm_term= .9cd31787592f.  
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to encourage shared custody. France is no except ion. Recent  debates have 
recent ly ar isen following a proposed law init iated by a polit ical party asking 
that  dual residency 6 for children become the default  situat ion.  
 
Though shared custody arrangements after divorce have become 
increasingly frequent , lit t le is known about  the econom ic consequences for 
parents. Most  of the research on the consequences of shared custody has 
focused on the educat ional at tainment , behaviour, health and well-being of 
children (Bauserman, 2012, Vanassche et  al., 2013)  or on st ress (Turunen, 
2017) , and to a lesser extent  on the non-econom ic consequences for 
parents. Some recent  papers analyse repartner ing opportunit ies for parents 
( I vanova et  al.,  2013, Schnor et  al. , 2017, Berger et  al., 2018)  or their  
well-being (Soderm an et  al. , 2015)  and health (St ruffolino, 2016) . Up to 
now, very lit t le research, to our knowledge, has studied the labour market  
consequences of shared custody for parents. Yet , having a job or remaining 
at  a job after divorce is the very means for avoiding a drast ic decline in 
one’s liv ing standards, and it  may help escape poverty. I t  is especially the 
case for mothers who bear more frequent ly the negat ive consequences 
(Finnie 1993, Smock, P. 1994, Bianchi et  al. 1999)  and who could have a 
more distant  relat ionship at  work than men for several reasons (past  work 
history, childbearing interrupt ions, lower wages,…).  
 
However, shared custody instead of sole custody may support  labour 
market  involvement , regardless of whether it  is a const rained or conscious 
choice. From a t ime perspect ive, custody every other week can relax 
childcare const raints and im prove the work- fam ily balance of lone mothers. 
This arrangement  should have a posit ive effect  on labour m arket  outcomes. 
From a monetary perspect ive, the effects are more m ixed. On the one 
hand, shared custody is often associated with no child support  payments, 
consider ing that  parents share the child cost  equally by taking care of 
children equally. The lack of child support  payments compared with 
mothers having sole custody m ight  be an incent ive for women with shared 
custody arrangements to work. On the other hand, child costs are also 
reduced because parents share these from the point  of separat ion onwards.    
 
Using r ich French adm inist rat ive fiscal data with informat ion on child 
custody arrangements at  the indiv idual level, this research paper aims to 
analyse whether shared custody leads recent ly divorced mothers to remain 
in the labour market  or to re-enter it . We provide evidence that  shared 
custody has posit ive and large effects on employment  after divorce 
compared to sole custody arrangements (+  16 percentage points) . We also 
                                    
6
  Precisely, the very recent  proposit ion from the deputy Lacombe makes a 
dist inct ion between the residency of children who automat ically reside in 
both parents’ dwellings – except  in some except ional cases – and the share 
of the child’s t ime, stat ing that  they are not  necessarily  equal.  
ht tp: / / www.assemblee-nat ionale.fr/ 15/ dossiers/ garde_alternee_ 
enfants.asp 
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document  heterogeneity across the populat ion. Larger posit ive effects are 
observed for previously inact ive women, for those belonging to the lowest  
income quint iles before divorce, for those with a young child, and for those 
with three children or more. Shared custody turns out  to be part icular ly 
helpful for women with weak t ies to the labour market . I t  may reduce work-
fam ily conflict  by dim inishing childcare expenses. I t  m ay enlarge the 
possibilit ies to find a suitable job because of more relaxed fam ily const raints 
for instance.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next  sect ion br iefly descr ibes the 
background on divorce, types of custody arrangements, and labour supply. 
I n Sect ion 3, we explain the channels at  work when analysing the links 
between types of custody arrangements and female act iv ity. The data and 
methodology used are descr ibed in Sect ion 4, with part icular discussion 
dedicated to tackling the issue of select ivit y. Sect ion 5 presents the results 
and Sect ion 6 concludes.  
 
2 . Background 
2 .1   Being em ployed is a  w ay for  lone m others to escape 
poverty after  divorce 
The econom ic consequences of divorce have been quite extensively 
studied, but  as far as we know there has been very lit t le focus on child 
custody arrangements. The literature on the econom ic consequences of 
divorce emphasizes the gendered econom ic consequences of union 
dissolut ion, showing a general worsening of women's living standards after 
separat ion while those of men remain stable or increase (Finnie, 1993, 
Andress et  al. 2006, etc.) .  As a consequence and in spite of welfare 
programs that  aim  to m it igate the negat ive econom ic consequences of 
divorce for parents, separated mothers and their  children st ill face huge 
poverty r isk in many count r ies (Brady, Burroway, 2012) . Finding a job or  
remaining at  their  current  one is a way to avoid or reduce the losses in 
liv ing standards faced after divorce. As such, this in turn helps escape 
poverty.  
 
However, re-enter ing or remaining in the labour market  after divorce could 
be hindered by the presence of children. Lone mothers with young children 
are one of the least -employed groups and they face high unemployment  
rates. Separated women with young children and/ or several children may 
face diff icult ies in returning to the labour market  because of fam ily-work 
schedule conflicts. As Table 1 shows, French lone mothers are more willing 
to be in the labour force than mothers in a relat ionship, whatever the 
number of children. However, lone mothers are effect ively less often 
employed than mothers in a relat ionship. The lone motherhood penalty on 
job access may part ly come from their  greater difficult ies in balancing 
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fam ily and work. For instance, they may be more likely to decline jobs with 
demanding schedules or those that  require long distance commut ing. Note 
also, however, that  when they are working, they more often do so on a full-
t ime basis² , probably because of heavy financial const raints. Regarding 
public t ransfers in France, lone parents can benefit  from  social benefit  
(called RSA Act ive solidar it y income)  when they are not  working. 7 On the 
other hand, they also benefit  from  substant ial tax reduct ions and are given 
st rong incent ives when they work while on welfare. 8 As a result , it  is not  
clear whether the percept ion of welfare benefits could const itute a st rong 
disincent ive to work. 
                                    
7
  From 2009, lone parents with one child could benefit  from an allowance of 
690 euros per month (maximum am ount  in case of no labour income and 
no housing allowance) . This amount  increases to 828 euros for lone parents 
with two children, 1012 for those with 3 children and 184 per addit ional 
child thereafter. They can also receive an addit ional allowance (ASF, 89 € 
monthly per child)  when they demonst rably do not  receive any support  
payment  from the other parent . Housing benefits are also important  for the 
low- income households.   
8
  The welfare system encourages welfare beneficiar ies to enter and return to 
the labour market . A part  of the social benefit  ( called RSA act ivité)  is 
maintained in case of low-paid act iv ity .   
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Table 1 : Mothers’ labour force part icipat ion in France, 2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 7  
( % )  
    
I n a 
relat ionship 
Lone 
mothers 
Labour market  
part icipat ion rate     
 
All mothers 82.7 88.5 
 
1 child 89.1 92.3 
 
2 children 84.8 88.9 
  
3 or +  
children 66.2 72.6 
Employment   rate      
 
All mothers 73.5 70.2 
 
1 child 79.7 75.5 
 
2 children 76.5 70.6 
  
3 or +  
children 55.5 48.9 
Part  t ime among 
workers      
 
All mothers 35.0 26.8 
 
1 child 26.5 22.9 
 
2 children 38.4 29.7 
  
3 or +  
children 47.0 40.2 
Source:  I nsee, Enquêtes annuelles de  recensement  2004 à 2007 (Chardon et  
Daguet , 2008)  
 
2 .2  Single- m other- focused act ive labour w elfare program s  
 
A st rand of the literature focuses on the employment  rate and the labour 
market  outcomes of lone/ single mothers. As lone parents – and part icular ly 
lone mothers – are at  a higher r isk of poverty and unemployment , they are 
often implicit ly or explicit ly targeted by welfare programs (Whitworth, 
2013) . Most  recent  programs aim  to im prove their  f inancial incent ives to 
work or to reduce their  “ inact ivity t rap” . Several studies analyse the effect  
of welfare reforms on lone mother employment  in the U.K. (Francesconi 
and van der Klaauw, 2007;  Gregg, Harkness and Sm ith, 2009) , in the U.S. 
(Meyer, 2002)  or in France (Dang and Trancart ,  2011) . They use as a 
cont rol group either the parents in a relat ionship or single and childless 
women. They generally f ind a posit ive effect  of such programs on lone 
parents’ employment  rate at  the extensive or intensive margins.  
 
2 .3  Em ploym ent  and child schedule 
 
Another group of studies highlights the crucial role that  childcare cost  plays 
in a mother’s employment  probabilit ies. For instance, Goux and Maurin 
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(2010)  find a posit ive effect  of ear ly educat ion 9 on employment  for lone 
mothers. Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007)  show a higher posit ive 
employment  impact  of the working fam ily tax credit  program for women 
having one pre-school aged child.   
 
However, the use of external care is only part  of the story. The difficult ies 
that  lone mothers experience in obtaining employment  may also differ 
according to the post -divorce parental arrangements regarding children, 
which is a dimension of lone mothers’ heterogeneity that  is largely 
neglected in the literature. The sole except ion is the contem poraneous work 
of Vuri (2017) , who studies changes in the labour market  outcomes of 
single mothers in the US following child custody reforms. She shows that  
the probability  of being in the labour force is not  affected by the int roduct ion 
of joint  custody at  the state level.  
 
2 .4  Our cont r ibut ions 
 
Thus, though the research and policies valued the importance of 
employment  to escape poverty for single mothers, and emphasized the 
child schedule as a crucial determ inant  of lone mother employability , most  
art icles do not  dist inguish among lone parents those who have children on 
a full t ime-  or almost  full- t ime-  basis from those with a more equal division 
of child t ime between both parents in cases of shared custody 
arrangements. Children’s post -divorce liv ing arrangements are a potent ial 
source of heterogeneity in a mother’s employment  behaviour after divorce, 
and this needs to be addressed. Our first  cont r ibut ion is to show that  “ part -
t ime mothering”  in the case of shared custody can help mothers get  a job. 
 
Our second cont r ibut ion cont rasts with Vuri (2017)  and many other 
econom ic studies (Böheim  et  al. 2012, Halla 2013)  in that  we are able to 
use indiv idual- level measures of post -divorce life-course arrangements 
instead of using aggregate measures or change in law. This individual 
informat ion is often m issing or concerns too few cases in surveys to study 
its consequences precisely. Our individual-based approach employs an 
appropriate ident ificat ion st rategy (descr ibed further)  to extend the 
exist ing literature on the consequences of shared custody. I t  does so by 
measuring a causal effect  for divorced mothers opt ing for this childcare 
arrangement  (our “ t reated group” )  rather than what  is often done:  just  for  
the whole populat ion of divorcees, regardless of the kind of childcare 
arrangements. 
 
Our third cont r ibut ion is to focus on de facto situat ions ( joint  physical 
custodies)  rather than on legal arrangements ( joint  legal custodies) . The 
de facto arrangements are much more informat ive since they affect  the 
                                    
9
  More precisely, having access to school in France from age two and a half 
instead of three. 
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t ime spent  by each parent  with her/ his child. Because they cont r ibute to 
daily life schedules, the de facto arrangements can be considered to have 
much more consequences on parents’ labour market  outcomes than legal 
arrangements. 10 
 
3 . How  custody arrangem ents m ay affect  m others’ 
act ivity?  
 
Several mechanism s may explain how the type of custody arrangement  
after divorce can affect  a mother’s act iv ity.   
 
First ,  t ime availability is a crucial point .  Shared custody arrangements are 
less t ime-consum ing than sole custody arrangements for parents. As 
mothers may spend less t ime on parent ing act iv it ies, they may increase 
t ime devoted to other act iv it ies such as work and possibly also leisure. 
Furthermore, joint  custody is associated with less parent ing burden and 
st ress (Bauserman, 2012)  than sole custody. Kit terød and Wiik (2017)  
pointed that  “ shared residence may be convenient  or necessary for mothers 
who want  to pursue careers” (p.564) . Balancing work and fam ily may be 
easier if mothers are able to work more intensively one out  of two weeks. 
Van der Heijden et  al. (2016)  recent ly showed a significant  reduct ion in 
t ime pressure for m others having a joint  custody arrangem ent  relat ive to 
main custodial mothers. I t  m ight  thus help mothers to cont inue working or 
enter a new job. 
 
Second, the organizat ional costs m ay be high in cases of shared custody 
arrangements, especially with young children (Bauserman, 2012) . 
However, it  remains unclear whether these costs are more pronounced than 
in sole custody arrangements where the most  common cases involve 
children visit ing their  fathers dur ing weekends.  
 
Third, an income effect  may play a role in two opposite direct ions. On the 
one hand, divorces with shared custody arrangement  are generally not  
associated with addit ional child support  payments. Parents are generally 
considered to share equally in child costs because they share equally in 
parental t ime. This absence of child support  may affect  a m other’s financial 
need to work, since public t ransfers for lone mothers only part ially alleviate 
budget  const raints. On the other hand, child’s needs are more naturally 
‘equally shared’, and child cost  is balanced between parents. Thus, mothers 
who opt  for shared custody m ight  need less money for their  children than 
those in sole custody. This could play negat ively on her likelihood to work. 
Note also that  because of socio-econom ic select ion, parents who opt  for  
                                    
10
  I n the case of France from 2002, legal parental responsibilit ies are shared 
between parents whether they are marr ied or not , and they cont inue after  
the couple disrupt ion. Cases where only one parent  is granted legal custody 
( “Autorité parentale” )  remain except ions. 
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shared custody arrangements are selected and generally wealthier. They 
may thus have different  (probably lower)  needs to work because of savings, 
but  they may also have different  preferences towards work (e.g., being 
more work-or iented for instance) . The income gradient  in shared custody 
prevalence and the result ing select ion issue is also a crucial point  that  
should be taken into account . 
 
Fourth, job market  opportunit ies m ight  be reduced in the case of shared 
custody. Due to the child’s frequent ly commut ing between parental homes 
on a regular basis, parents are const rained to live close to each other and 
also close to their  child’s school (Ferrar i et  al.,  2017) . For this reason, they 
are less likely to accept  a job far from their  home than would parents with 
sole custody.  
 
Last ly, divorces with shared custody arrangements are generally less 
conflictual11, that  m ight  facilitate parents’ self-esteem and at t itudes toward 
work. I t  may help mothers become less st ressed and thus recover more 
easily after divorce, which in turn will facilitate their  maintaining or re-
enter ing the labour market . There is also a posit ive associat ion between 
egalitar ian values toward parental responsibilit ies and the choice of shared 
custody arrangements (Solsona and Ajenjo, 2017) . I n this situat ion, 
women may then be more likely to work. However, shared custody involves 
the need to live close to the former spouse and to have frequent  contacts 
with the other parent , especially when the children are young. This could 
become a source of st ress (Bauserman, 2012) , for instance, if parents 
disagree about  daily organizat ion or educat ional decisions.   
 
The overall effect  is unclear and depends on the relat ive st rength of the 
diverse effects. Moreover, heterogeneity in women’s character ist ics and 
situat ions may imply heterogeneous effects that  we want  to account  for.  
 
4 . Data and m ethod 
 
4 .1  A huge select ivity issue  
 
As suggested by the several mechanisms we previously pointed out , the 
type of post -divorce child arrangement  is not  random, and couples who 
choose joint  custody arrangements m ight  be highly selected. As it  happens, 
mothers using shared custody have different  observed and probably 
unobserved character ist ics. They are generally more educated and 
wealthier (Kit terød & Lyngstad, 2012) ;  they m ight  have less conflictual 
relat ionships or more egalitar ian values toward sharing parental tasks;  and 
they m ight  be more work-or iented. Note that  recent  works from Meyer et  
                                    
11
  As explained below, the quality of the parents’ relat ionship is evaluated by 
a fam ily affair  j udge before grant ing shared custody. 
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al. (2017)  on US or Kit terød and Wiik (2017)  on Norway emphasize that  
shared custody is becom ing more common among the whole populat ion, 
and that  parents would be thus less selected nowadays. Parents opt ing for 
shared custody arrangements st ill have part icular character ist ics however.   
 
Because of this potent ial select iv ity (or reverse causality)  issue, sim ple 
empir ical analysis comparing the outcomes between the two groups of 
mothers ( those with sole custody and those with shared custody)  are likely 
to be biased.  Reverse causality appears if mothers who want  to work 
choose shared custody arrangements for this reason. Table 2 shows that  
divorce is posit ively associated with female part icipat ion for both mothers 
who choose sole or shared custody. I t  also shows that  mothers who chose 
shared custody were more likely to work before the divorce than mothers 
who opted for sole custody.  
 
Table 2 : Mothers’ Labour Market  Part icipat ion before and after  
divorce according to child custody arrangem ents 
 
 
Child custody arrangements 
Labour market  part icipat ion of 
mothers 
Before divorce After divorce 
Sole custody 0.841 0.894 
Shared custody 0.943 0.972 
Source:  French Fiscal data, divorcees in 2009 
 
I t  is challenging to find a way to t reat  this select ion issue. However, in a 
previous work (Bonnet  et  al.,  2015) , we show that  shared custody 
arrangement  decisions do not  depend only on couples’ character ist ics but  
also on resident ial locat ion. I n France, the share of child custody ranges 
from 7 to 21% , depending on the place of residence (see Figure 1) . These 
differences go largely beyond the populat ion st ructure or socioeconom ic 
differences, and they are likely to come from a divorce court  (or fam ily 
judge decisions)  effect  at  the local level. Taking advantage of these huge 
terr itor ial discrepancies ( that  are not  linked to indiv idual character ist ics) ,  
we are able to correct  for the endogeneity of choosing shared custody and 
to est imate a causal effect  of child arrangements on the extensive margins 
of women’s labour market  part icipat ion after divorce.  
 
4 .2  Data  
 
Using the French exhaust ive adm inist rat ive income- tax database, which 
has been recent ly made available in France, we select  the sample of 2009 
divorced mothers (and those who break a PACS:  the French civil 
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partnership) . After excluding tax returns with m issing data12, we obtain a 
sample composed of 61,554 women aged 20 to 55 who were marr ied or 
“PACSed”  ( in 2008)  and separated in 2009.  
 
The huge size of our dataset  allows observing a substant ial number of 
parents with shared custody arrangements, which is in cont rast  to most  
previous studies using survey samples. The custody regime has to be 
declared on the income tax return because it  gives some tax refunds for  
having children. According to the tax adm inist rat ion, shared/  joint  custody 
means that  the t ime children spent  in each parent ’s home should be 
“ roughly”  equal. 13  
 
Furthermore, compared to usual survey data in which incomes are self-
reported and subject  to im precise responses, incomes in tax- income 
datasets are already filled in by the fiscal adm inist rat ion and are thus 
definit ively more reliable. The complete fam ily composit ion (number of 
members, age of children, child( ren)  custody arrangements)  is also 
reported.  
 
We define the state of “being employed”  (versus “not  employed” )  as 
receiving at  least  labour market  earnings above two months of m inimum 
wage, i.e., 2,100 yearly euros in 2009. We conduct  robustness checks on 
this threshold for defining “having a job”  and show that  our  results are not  
sensit ive to this definit ion (see appendix A3) .  
 
 
                                    
12 
 We fully descr ibe in Appendix C the several steps for creat ing the dataset  
(Bonnet  et  al., 2016) . We also detail weight  computat ions to account  for  
potent ial different ial at t r it ion using tools developed by the French 
Stat ist ical I nst itute ( “macro CALMAR”) . The same weights rest r icted to 
mothers are always used here to insure nat ionally representat ive results. 
13 
 We cannot  completely rule out  that  – for tax benefits – parents can declare 
child custody arrangements that  are different  from their  actual pract ices. 
However, as they are supposed to report  the same child custody 
arrangement  on both tax- returns, this behaviour is r isky and unlikely. As 
we show in Bonnet  et  al.  (2015) , divergences between the two parents are 
very rare ( less than 10% ) .  
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Figure 1 : Proport ion of shared custody arrangem ents,  
French departm ents ( 2 0 0 8 )  
 
 
 
4 .3  Model  
 
Our aim  is to assess the effect  of shared custody arrangements on the 
labour market  part icipat ion of mothers. We first  est im ate a sim ple probit  
model on the probability  of being em ployed after divorce for mothers, 
whether they have adopted a shared or sole custody arrangement .  
 
However, as already discussed, custody arrangements are presumed to be 
endogenous. Couples who opt  for shared custody may have different  
observed and unobserved character ist ics;  and women may potent ially  
differ from those who opt  for sole custody arrangements. 
 
Our ident ificat ion st rategy relies on the way custody arrangements are 
granted. Usually the process is the following. Divorced parents, following 
their  lawyer’s advice, decide on the child custody arrangements that  they 
propose to the fam ily court  judge. To assess a parental request  for shared 
custody, fam ily court  judges are asked to take into account  the “child’s 
well-being” . They evaluate it  through several dimensions:  the child’s age 
and matur ity, the relat ionship between the parents, the distance between 
the parental home, and the general character ist ics of the situat ion (parents’ 
availability , comfort  of the dwellings, etc.) . There are no specific rules about  
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how to consider and weight  each of these elements, and they are therefore 
open to interpretat ion. I n the absence of precise guidelines, fam ily judges 
have to take their  decision relying on their  own way of consider ing these 
different  elements while also taking into account  the parents’ wishes that  
were init ially advised by their  lawyers. I n pract ice, judges rarely go against  
the parents’ request . I n most  cases (90% 14 of cases according to the 
Minist ry of just ice15) , the parents relied on the help of their  lawyers to agree 
before the judgement , which guarantees a quicker process. The real “ init ial 
choice”  of the parents cannot  be observed because the lawyers for both 
parents may advise them to change their  init ial choice of custody 
arrangement  if it  is deemed likely to be refused by the fam ily judge or not  
compat ible with the other partner ’s choice. As it  turns out , fam ily judges 
and lawyers joint ly play a crucial role in the final decision. The final decision 
relies on several factors, but  most ly on the judge’s opinions regarding the 
“child’s well-being” 16 and on the lawyers’ experience, which altogether 
makes the final result  exogenous to the init ial parents’ choice. 
 
As a proxy for this simultaneous “ judge/ lawyer effect ” , we use the share of 
custody arrangements granted in each French départem ent  (henceforth 
“department” ) . 17 Since we cont rol for parents’ character ist ics and local 
unemployment 18, the var iability in the remaining part  of this share relies 
most ly on how different  judges and lawyers evaluate sim ilar situat ions. I t  
thus const itutes a valid inst rument . Moreover, the high value of the 
stat ist ics when test ing the nullity of the inst rument  in the first -stage 
regression rules out  the r isk of a weak inst rument  issue. 19  
 
                                    
14 
 Among them, 10%  of decisions correspond to situat ions where a parent  did 
not  make any custody request .  
15  See Guillonneau and Moreau (2013) . 
16  Even when both parents ask for shared custody, j udges can refuse if they 
consider it  could harm the child. 
17  We do not  consider overseas departments. 
18  The unemployment  rate was the only significant  parameter of the 
regression we ran at  the aggregated level to explain the proport ion of 
shared custody at  the department  level (see Appendix 2) . We added it  and 
its square in the simultaneous equat ion model as an addit ional cont rol.  
19
 
  We test  the nullity of our inst rument  in two ways. First , consistent  with our 
non- linear specificat ion, we use a univar iate probit  model where shared 
custody at  the indiv idual level is regressed on all the covariates used in the 
bivar iate probit . The Chi square stat ist ics obtained when test ing the nullity 
of our inst rument  is 141. This is clear ly a high value. To compare the 
stat ist ics of the test  with the usual thresholds used to detect  weak 
inst ruments (see Stock et  al. , 2002) , we perform  a simple linear regression 
( in the same way as with the previous univar iate probit ) . The F-stat ist ic is 
82, which is clear ly m uch higher than the standard thresholds that  are 
used. We are thus confident  about  the fact  that  our inst rument  is not  a 
weak inst rument . 
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We use a simultaneous equat ion model.  I ndeed, custody arrangements and 
labour market  part icipat ion decisions m ight  be taken sim ultaneously. I n the 
context  of a binary endogenous and dependent  var iable, we est imate a 
recursive bivar iate probit  model to assess the effect  for m others of shared 
custody (SCi)  on being employed (Ei) .  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑑𝑑 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
Zd is the proport ion of shared custody in the different  departments 
(count ies)  of France used as an inst rumental (exclusion)  var iable. Xi 
includes different  covariates that  could have an influence on having a job:  
mother’s age, num ber and age of the children, household income in 2008, 
and the share of the couple’s resources that  the woman provided before 
divorce.  
 
We provide the results of a placebo test  in Appendix 1. They suggest  that  
our inst rument  is uncorrelated with unobserved character ist ics that  may 
play a role in women’s employment  (part icular ly among divorced women) . 
 
We addit ionally ran a regression at  the macro- level to see whether the 
proport ion of shared custody at  the local level m ight  be explained by local 
character ist ics (see Appendix 2) . The var iability  remains, whatever the 
numerous character ist ics tested.  
 
5 . Results 
5 .1  Baseline m odel 
 
Table 3 presents the simple probit  and the recursive probit  model with two 
steps, as well as both coefficients and marginal effects.  
 
Regarding the probability to opt  for a shared custody arrangement  (col. 6-
7, Table 3) , we observe that  our exclusion var iable is highly significant . The 
proport ion of shared custody agreements at  the local level has a posit ive 
and very significant  effect  on the indiv idual likelihood to opt  for a shared 
custody arrangement . Shared custody is less com mon for mothers with 
three or more children than for smaller fam ilies. Sharing t im e with children 
equally is more frequent  when the youngest  child is between 4 and 7 years 
old, and less frequent  for younger and older children. Older children can 
decide more freely with whom to live, and shared custody arrangements 
are less likely for teenagers. We observe an expected posit ive income 
gradient  with a higher probability of shared custody among wealthier 
households. Another indicator of wealth is the homeownership status before 
divorce, which is posit ively associated with the choice of shared custody. 
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The town size has very lit t le effect .  20 Last ly, shared custody is also less 
frequent  for women who were out  of the labour force before divorce. 
Consistent  with their  possibly more t radit ional values and gender role 
division, they are m ore likely to have sole custody after divorce.  
 
Being in shared custody arrangements is associated with a 5.2 percentage 
point  higher probability of being employed after divorce (col. 2, Table 3)  in 
the univar iate model. When using a recursive bivar iate probit  model for  
taking into account  the potent ial endogeneity of shared custody (col. 3) , 
the effect  becomes more pronounced. We observe that  unobserved 
select ion indeed plays a role, as demonst rated by the correlat ion between 
the residuals of the two equat ions, which is negat ive and signif icant ly 
different  from zero. The probability of being employed turns out  to be 16 
percentage points higher for mothers with shared custody arrangements 
than sole custodial mothers.   
 
To bet ter understand the direct ion of the change21, we refer to the usual 
local average t reatment  effect  (LATE)  interpretat ion. Women who are 
compliers for our inst rument  are those who would not  have obtained shared 
custody if they had been in a department  that  rarely grants it  but  instead 
obtained it  because they live in a department  where shared custody is more 
frequent ly granted. We interpret  the negat ive sign of the rho as follows:  
women who are compliers, i.e., those who react  to the local var iat ion of 
shared custody, have unobserved character ist ics that  affect  employment  
negat ively.  
The other cont rol var iables give expected results. The probabilit y to work 
after divorce increases in age and in the age of the youngest  child while it  
decreases in the number of children. The act iv ity rate is higher for wealthier 
households, in big cit ies and when the unemployment  rate is low.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
20
  Liv ing in very big towns has a small negat ive effect  on having shared 
custody, which is probably related to the higher pr ice of housing that  could 
const itute a const raint  to having two  dwellings with enough space for 
host ing children one out  of two weeks. 
21 
 As well as the negat ive rho of the bivar iate model. 
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Table 3 : Effect  of shared custody on m others’ em ploym ent  
 Univariate  Probit  Bivar iate probit  
 Em ploym ent  Em ploym ent  Shared custody 
 Coef.  ME Coef.  ME Coef.  ME 
Individual Shared custody 0.295 * * *  
(0.027)  
0.052 * * *  
(0.004)  
1.023 * * *  
(0.195)  
0.155 * * *  
(0.025)  
  
Shared Custody per 100 
divorces in the 
departm ent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.037 * * *  
(0.005)  
0.008 * * *  
(0.001)  
PACS 0.128 * *  
(0.047)  
0.024 * *  
(0.009)  
0.113 *  
(0.046)  
0.023 *  
(0.009)  
0.052 
(0.033)  
0.011 
(0.007)  
Age 0.099 * * *  
(0.010)  
0.019 * * *  
(0.002)  
0.086 * * *  
(0.012)  
0.017 * * *  
(0.002)  
0.062 * * *  
(0.014)  
0.013 * * *  
(0.003)  
Age^ 2 -0.001 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.000 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.001 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.000 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.001 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.000 * * *  
(0.000)  
Num ber of children = 2  
( ref= 1 child)  
-0.002 
(0.018)  
-0.000 
(0.003)  
-0.001 
(0.017)  
-0.000 
(0.004)  
-0.007 
(0.018)  
-0.001 
(0.004)  
3 children -0.160 * * *  
(0.021)  
-0.030 * * *  
(0.004)  
-0.130 * * *  
(0.023)  
-0.027 * * *  
(0.004)  
-0.157 * * *  
(0.022)  
-0.033 * * *  
(0.005)  
4 or m ore -0.376 * * *  
(0.025)  
-0.071 * * *  
(0.005)  
-0.319 * * *  
(0.033)  
-0.065 * * *  
(0.005)  
-0.432 * * *  
(0.047)  
-0.090 * * *  
(0.010)  
Youngest  child = 0-3 
( ref= 4-12)  
0.007 
(0.021)  
0.001 
(0.004)  
0.025 
(0.019)  
0.005 
(0.004)  
-0.141 * * *  
(0.018)  
-0.030 * * *  
(0.004)  
Youngest= 13+  0.029 
(0.022)  
0.006 
(0.004)  
0.069 * *  
(0.025)  
0.014 * *  
(0.005)  
-0.263 * * *  
(0.025)  
-0.055 * * *  
(0.005)  
Household Incom e_Q1 
( ref= Q3)  
-0.499 * * *  
(0.029)  
-0.095 * * *  
(0.005)  
-0.436 * * *  
(0.041)  
-0.089 * * *  
(0.006)  
-0.425 * * *  
(0.028)  
-0.089 * * *  
(0.006)  
Household Incom e_Q2 -0.278 * * *  
(0.025)  
-0.053 * * *  
(0.005)  
-0.232 * * *  
(0.035)  
-0.047 * * *  
(0.006)  
-0.213 * * *  
(0.021)  
-0.045 * * *  
(0.005)  
Household Incom e_Q4 0.203 * * *  
(0.028)  
0.039 * * *  
(0.005)  
0.152 * * *  
(0.033)  
0.031 * * *  
(0.006)  
0.213 * * *  
(0.018)  
0.044 * * *  
(0.004)  
Household Incom e_Q5 0.113 * * *  
(0.032)  
0.021 * * *  
(0.006)  
0.045 
(0.040)  
0.009 
(0.008)  
0.334 * * *  
(0.028)  
0.070 * * *  
(0.006)  
Working before 
separat ion 
1.194 * * *  
(0.023)  
0.227 * * *  
(0.004)  
1.127 * * *  
(0.041)  
0.230 * * *  
(0.005)  
0.227 * * *  
(0.020)  
0.047 * * *  
(0.004)  
Hom eowner 0.147 * * *  
(0.017)  
0.028 * * *  
(0.003)  
0.100 * * *  
(0.025)  
0.020 * * *  
(0.005)  
0.293 * * *  
(0.020)  
0.061 * * *  
(0.004)  
Unem ploym ent  rate -0.062 * * *  
(0.016)  
-0.012 * * *  
(0.003)  
-0.052 * *  
(0.017)  
-0.010 * * *  
(0.003)  
0.004 
(0.017)  
0.001 
(0.004)  
Unem ploym ent  rate^ 2 0.002 * * *  
(0.001)  
0.000 * * *  
(0.000)  
0.002 * * *  
(0.001)  
0.000 * * *  
(0.000)  
-0.000 
(0.001)  
-0.000 
(0.000)  
Town size=  2000-4999 
( ref=  rural)  
0.031 
(0.032)  
0.006 
(0.006)  
0.027 
(0.031)  
0.005 
(0.006)  
0.018 
(0.029)  
0.004 
(0.006)  
5000-9999 -0.068 
(0.038)  
-0.013 
(0.008)  
-0.064 
(0.037)  
-0.013 
(0.008)  
-0.028 
(0.028)  
-0.006 
(0.006)  
10000-19999 -0.047 
(0.034)  
-0.009 
(0.007)  
-0.056 
(0.033)  
-0.012 
(0.007)  
0.080 *  
(0.037)  
0.017 *  
(0.008)  
20000-49999 -0.078 * *  
(0.029)  
-0.015 * *  
(0.006)  
-0.077 * *  
(0.028)  
-0.016 * *  
(0.006)  
0.008 
(0.030)  
0.002 
(0.006)  
50000-99999 -0.051 
(0.032)  
-0.010 
(0.006)  
-0.050 
(0.030)  
-0.010 
(0.006)  
-0.006 
(0.035)  
-0.001 
(0.007)  
100000-199999 -0.101 *  
(0.048)  
-0.020 *  
(0.010)  
-0.107 *  
(0.045)  
-0.022 *  
(0.010)  
0.030 
(0.044)  
0.006 
(0.009)  
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> 200000 -0.030 
(0.025)  
-0.006 
(0.005)  
-0.033 
(0.024)  
-0.007 
(0.005)  
0.032 
(0.024)  
0.007 
(0.005)  
Paris Area 0.067 * *  
(0.026)  
0.012 * *  
(0.005)  
0.095 * * *  
(0.028)  
0.019 * *  
(0.006)  
-0.098 * *  
(0.035)  
-0.019 * *  
(0.007)  
Constant  -1.245 * * *  
(0.216)  
 
 
-1.210 * * *  
(0.208)   
-2.572 * * *  
(0.283)  
 
 
Rho  
 
 
 
-0.414 * *  
(0.119)  
Observat ions 61554 61554 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  *  p <  0.05, * *  p <  0.01, * * *  p <  0.001 
Note:  Reference:  sole custody arrangements, one child, aged 4 to 12 years old, 
household income in the third quint ile in 2008, renter and out  of the labour force 
in 2008.  
  
 
5 .2  Heterogeneous effects 
According to their  pre-divorce character ist ics, being in shared custody 
arrangements may not  have the same labour market  consequences for all 
mothers. To assess heterogeneous effects, we simultaneously interact  four 
var iables (previous occupat ional status, num ber of children, age of 
youngest  child and income quint ile)  with shared custody (Table 4) .  
 
Shared custody arrangements play a greater role in having a job for women 
who were inact ive before divorce than for women who were already 
working. The employment  rate for mothers who were inact ive before 
divorce and opted for a shared custody arrangement  is 51 percentage 
points higher than for inact ive women who had sole custody arrangements. 
The posit ive effect  of shared custody on female employment  is also more 
pronounced for mothers belonging to the lowest  quint ile of income before 
divorce ( the probability is 45 percentage points higher for mothers with 
shared custody mothers than those with sole custody) . This advantage 
dim inishes for wealthier mothers. The posit ive effect  of shared custody 
arrangements following divorce is also more pronounced for mothers with 
several children compared to mothers with one or two children. Mothers 
with infants and in shared custody arrangements are also more likely to 
work than mothers with infants and have their  children on almost  a full-
t ime basis.  
 
  
17 
 
Table 4 -  Heterogeneous effects of shared custody on m others’ 
em ploym ent  
       Coef.  se ME se 
Shared custody (SC)  1.400 * * *  (0.127)  0.223 * * *      (0.014)  
Num ber of children=  1 Ref    
2 -0.010  (0.018)    
3 -0.112 * * *     (0.021)    
4+  -0.274 * * *  (0.031)    
Shared custody *  Nb. children = 1 Ref  0.195 * * *  (0.014)  
Shared custody *  Nb. children = 2 0.096 *  (0.047)  0.196 * * *  (0.014)  
Shared custody *  Nb. children = 3 0.173 *  (0.072)  0.280 * * *  (0.015)  
Shared custody *  Nb. children = 4+  0.386 * * *  (0.115)  0.416 * * *  (0.014)  
Household quint ile = Q1 -0.375 * * *  (0.037)    
Q2 -0.179 * * *  (0.033)    
Q3 Ref    
Q4 0.089 * *  (0.033)    
Q5 -0.018 (0.038)    
Shared custody *  Q1 0.259 * *  (0.093)  0.448 * * *  (0.015)  
Shared custody *  Q2 0.058 (0.064)  0.255 * * *  (0.012)  
Shared custody *  Q3 Ref  0.151 * * *  (0.014)  
Shared custody *  Q4 0.011 (0.075)  0.120 * * *  (0.015)  
Shared custody *  Q5 -0.022 (0.068)  0.143 * * *  (0.018)  
Em ployed  1.031 * * *  (0.042)    
Out  of labour force  Ref    
Shared custody *  Em ployed -0.154 * *  (0.056)  0.139 * * *  (0.013)  
Shared custody *  OLF Ref  0.509 * * *  (0.018)  
0-3 0.026 (0.019)    
4-12 Ref    
13-17 0.107 * * *  (0.023)    
Shared custody *   0-3 0.169 * *  (0.061)  0.271 * * *  (0.015)  
Shared custody *  4-12 Ref  0.212 * * *  (0.015)  
Shared custody *  13-17 -0.079 (0.064)  0.172 * * *  (0.011)  
PACS 0.089 *  (0.043)    
Age 0.069 * * *  (0.012)    
Age^ 2 -0.001 * * *  (0.000)    
Hom eowner 0.047 *  (0.023)    
Unem ploym ent  rate -0.035 *  (0.015)    
Unem ploym ent  rate ^ 2 0.001 * *  (0.001)    
Town size = rural Ref    
2000-4999 0.021 (0.029)    
5000-9999 -0.057 (0.034)    
10000-19999 -0.062 *  (0.031)    
20000-49999 -0.069 * *  (0.026)    
50000-99999 -0.045 (0.028)    
100000-199999 -0.106 * *  (0.041)    
> 200000 -0.031 (0.023)    
Paris Area 0.123 * * *  (0.027)    
Constant  -1.125 * * *  (0.203)    
Observat ions 61554    
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *  p <  0.05, * *  p <  0.01, * * *  p <  0.001 
Note:  I f we consider the sub-populat ion of mothers with one child, the probabilit y 
of having a job after divorce in 2010 is 19.5 percentage points higher for shared 
custody arrangements compared with sole-custody arrangements.  
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I nterest ingly, all these results point  in the same direct ion and are fully  
consistent . All the common penalt ies encountered by mothers in the labour 
market  – having young children, several children, being in a poor household 
before divorce (possibly associated to a low level of educat ion) , with career 
breaks ( inact ive women)  – do not  disappear but  are largely reduced in the 
case of shared custody arrangements after divorce. This m eans that  even 
though shared custody is more likely to be chosen by wealthier parents and 
act ive mothers and has a posit ive effect  on labour force part icipat ion for all 
mothers, we observe more pronounced effects for mothers further away 
from the labour market . I n one sense, this result  could be expected because 
the women already involved in the labour market  do not  have much reason 
to decrease their  labour force part icipat ion after divorce, whatever the 
custody arrangements – especially in a context  of decreasing econom ies of 
scale following divorce (Bonnet  et  al.,  2015) . However, for women who 
were further away the labour market  because of their  fam ily burdens, 
marital specializat ion choices or hum an capital, our results show that  
custody arrangements are crucial.  
 
5 .3  The role of child support  paym ents  
  
Child support  paym ents have not  been considered so far because they are 
potent ially  endogenous. The percept ion of child support  payments is a key 
issue, since they could be a disincent ive for mothers to work if they receive 
substant ial child support , and they could be an incent ive for those receiving 
no support  payments. I n France, in m ost  cases, there is no t ransfer of 
money between parents who opt  for shared custody, since they are 
considered to share child costs equally. 22 For this reason, the percept ion of 
child custody paym ents is potent ially endogenous. However some mothers 
with children in shared custody declare that  they receive child support  
( roughly 15% ). Moreover, a significant  share of mothers with sole custody 
do not  receive child support , either because there is no obligat ion decided 
by the court  ( the father does not  have enough resources or the mother 
earns enough)  or because the father does not  make the required payments. 
We run our bivar iate probit  on two different  subsamples of whether or not  
the mother receives child support  paym ents, regardless of the amount .  
 
Results (Table 5)  show that  the main effect  of shared custody is st ill 
significant  and posit ive, but  the magnitude is much st ronger for the 
mothers who receive child support .  For mothers who do not  receive any 
                                    
22
  Moreover, the tax t reatment  of child support  payments changes according 
to the type of child custody arrangement . I n sole custody arrangements, 
paid child support  payments are deduct ible from taxable income and 
payments received have to be included in taxable income. I n shared 
custody arrangements, neither the child support  received nor the child 
support  paid is considered in the income tax return. So, data collect ion on 
child support  payments in case of shared custody may be incomplete.  
19 
 
child support  paym ent , the magnitude of the shared custody effect  is 
weaker. I n that  case, the income effect  (via the possible lack of resources)  
m ight  be a st ronger determ inant  in the decision to enter or re-enter the job 
market . What  is par t icular ly interest ing is the opposite effect  observed for 
the interact ion of shared custody and being inact ive before divorce:  For 
inact ive mothers receiving child support  payments, shared custody has a 
posit ive effect  on employment ;  whereas, for those who receive no child 
payments, shared custody (compared to sole custody)  has less posit ive 
effects. Being in a sole custody arrangement  without  receiving payments 
from the father means that  the mother pays all child costs;  whereas in 
shared custody the cost  is more equally divided in relat ion to each 
household’s child schedules. This higher child cost  for m others in sole 
custody without  pr ivate t ransfers m ight  be a st rong incent ive to work. The 
monetary const raints take precedence over the t ime const raints. This result  
m it igates the previous results by emphasizing the monetary const raints of 
lone mothers. Shared custody can thus “help”  mothers to work, but  some 
mothers in sole custody – specifically, those without  financial support  from  
their  previous partner – may also be “obliged”  to work.  
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Table 5 -  Effect  of shared custody on m others’ em ploym ent , according to repartner ing and child 
support  paym ents 
 With child support   Without  child support   Repartnered Not  Repartnered 
 Coef  ME Coef ME Coef ME Coef ME 
Shared custody  1.813* * *  0.209* * *  0.292 0.097*  0.689 0.097*  1.494* * *  0.240* * *  
(0.122)  (0.004)  (0.274)  (0.049)  (0.524)  (0.049)  (0.092)  (0.010)  
Nb. of child.= 2 ( ref= 1)  -0.033  -0.006  -0.082* *   0.004  
(0.025)   (0.029)   (0.039)   (0.019)   
3 -0.174* * *   -0.108* * *   -0.210* * *   -0.085* * *   
 (0.027)   (0.038)   (0.053)   (0.021)   
4+  -0.413* * *   -0.290* * *   -0.416* * *   -0.235* * *   
 (0.043)   (0.048)   (0.064)   (0.036)   
Shared custody *  1 child ref 0.173* * *  ref 0.077*  ref 0.079 ref 0.215* * *  
 (0.005)   (0.046)   (0.061)   (0.010)  
Shared custody *  2 children 0.083 0.179* * *  0.140* *  0.089* *  0.112 0.099 0.092 0.212* * *  
(0.081)  (0.005)  (0.064)  (0.040)  (0.117)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.011)  
Shared custody *  3 children 0.275* * *  0.278* * *  0.101 0.121*  0.148 0.144 0.177* *  0.295* * *  
(0.093)  (0.006)  (0.104)  (0.066)  (0.142)  (0.086)  (0.078)  (0.010)  
Shared custody *  4+  children 0.381* *  0.446* * *  0.200 0.196*  0.322 0.234 0.376* * *  0.426* * *  
(0.153)  (0.012)  (0.183)  (0.100)  (0.344)  (0.150)  (0.122)  (0.012)  
Hous. I ncom e= Q1 ( ref= Q3)  -0.484* * *   -0.523* * *   -0.432* * *   -0.358* * *   
(0.040)   (0.053)   (0.071)   (0.033)   
Q2 -0.216* * *   -0.275* * *   -0.264* * *   -0.150* * *   
 (0.035)   (0.045)   (0.059)   (0.033)   
Q4 0.102* * *   0.170* * *   0.213* * *   0.048  
 (0.033)   (0.062)   (0.063)   (0.031)   
Q5 -0.067*   0.165* *   0.032  -0.042  
 (0.035)   (0.072)   (0.057)   (0.036)   
Shared custody *  Q1 0.282*  0.520* * *  0.128 
 
0.196*  -0.185 0.197 0.373* * *  0.469* * *  
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(0.161)  (0.012)  (0.131)  (0.100)  (0.221)  (0.147)  (0.095)  (0.009)  
Shared custody *  Q2 0.124 0.281* * *  -0.008 0.102*  -0.236 0.124 0.126*  0.268* * *  
(0.117)  (0.006)  (0.099)  (0.054)  (0.166)  (0.085)  (0.068)  (0.007)  
Shared custody *  Q3 ref 0.134* * *  ref 0.059* *  ref 0.087*  ref 0.166* * *  
 (0.005)   (0.028)   (0.038)   (0.011)  
Shared custody *  Q4 0.055 0.098* * *  -0.001 0.041*  -0.294*  0.043 0.116 0.143* * *  
(0.121)  (0.004)  (0.100)  (0.022)  (0.167)  (0.032)  (0.080)  (0.013)  
Shared custody *  Q5 -0.175*  0.136* * *  -0.012 0.039 -0.102 0.072 0.018 0.163* * *  
(0.095)  (0.006)  (0.106)  (0.024)  (0.199)  (0.039)  (0.070)  (0.015)  
Em ployed 1.204* * *   1.015* * *   1.116* * *   0.995* * *   
(0.025)   (0.037)   (0.052)   (0.040)   
Shared custody *  OLF  0.541* * *   0.204*   0.225  0.529* * *  
 (0.010)   (0.122)   (0.172)   (0.010)  
Shared custody *  Em ployed -0.357* * *  0.097* * *  0.148* *  0.065* *  0.025 0.069*  -0.182* * *  0.148* * *  
(0.089)  (0.003)  (0.075)  (0.028)  (0.139)  (0.036)  (0.059)  (0.011)  
Youngest  child 0-3 ( ref= 4-12)  0.071* * *   -0.025  -0.021  0.037*   
(0.025)   (0.029)   (0.042)   (0.021)   
Youngest  child =  13-17 0.069* *   0.077*   0.068  0.126* * *   
(0.027)   (0.041)   (0.049)   (0.032)   
SC *  youngest  child= 0-3 0.135 0.245* * *  0.205* *  0.141* *  0.024 0.126 0.229* * *  0.290* * *  
(0.105)  (0.005)  (0.086)  (0.057)  (0.126)  (0.077)  (0.061)  (0.010)  
SC *  youngest  child= 4-12 ref 0.199* * *  ref 0.086*  ref 0.109 ref 0.228* * *  
 (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.046)   (0.065)   (0.011)  
SC *  youngest  child= 13-17 -0.151 0.173* * *  -0.153 0.052 -0.181 0.072 -0.081 0.181* * *  
(0.097)  (0.006)  (0.107)  (0.049)  (0.157)  (0.068)  (0.062)  (0.008)  
PACS 0.187* * *   0.093  0.225* * *   0.037  
 (0.057)   (0.061)   (0.068)   (0.051)   
Age 0.105* * *   0.071* * *   0.102* * *   0.056* * *   
 (0.014)   (0.016)   (0.026)   (0.012)   
Age^ 2 -0.001* * *   -0.001* * *   -0.001* * *   -0.001* * *   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
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Hom eowner 0.084* * *   0.137* * *   0.124* * *   0.029  
 (0.022)   (0.045)   (0.046)   (0.022)   
Unem p. Rate -0.051* * *   -0.041* *   -0.062* * *   -0.026*   
 (0.015)   (0.020)   (0.022)   (0.014)   
Unem p. rate^ 2 0.002* * *   0.001* *   0.002* * *   0.001* *   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   
Town size=  2000-4999 
( ref= rural)  
0.004  0.027  0.076  0.009  
(0.038)   (0.047)   (0.065)   (0.032)   
5000-9999 -0.012  -0.133* * *   -0.074  -0.054  
 (0.043)   (0.051)   (0.085)   (0.035)   
10000-19999 -0.109* * *   0.004  -0.075  -0.058*   
 (0.042)   (0.052)   (0.065)   (0.031)   
20000-49999 -0.073*   -0.093*   -0.058  -0.065* *   
 (0.040)   (0.048)   (0.054)   (0.031)   
50000-99999 -0.108* *   -0.014  -0.158* * *   -0.019  
 (0.043)   (0.045)   (0.059)   (0.031)   
100000-199999 -0.076  -0.120*   -0.149  -0.094* *   
(0.056)   (0.067)   (0.106)   (0.037)   
> 200000 -0.054*   -0.042  -0.014  -0.035  
 (0.031)   (0.032)   (0.046)   (0.025)   
Paris Area 0.028  0.092* *   0.135* * *   0.117* * *   
 (0.040)   (0.041)   (0.049)   (0.032)   
Constant  -1.616* * *   -0.762* *   -1.297* * *   -0.987* * *   
 (0.288)   (0.300)   (0.479)   (0.223)   
Observat ions 30,589  30,965  13,628  47,926  
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * * *  p< 0.01, * *  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1. 
Note:  I f we consider the sub-populat ion of mothers with child support  (col. 2 and 3)  and among them mothers with one child, 
the probability of having a job after  divorce in 2010 is 17.3 percentage points higher for shared custody arrangements 
compared with sole-custody arrangements.  
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5 .4  The role of repartner ing  
 
Addit ionally, we take into account  the repartner ing event  that  may affect  
both the labour market  and custody arrangement  decisions. Form ing a new 
couple may also be endogenous because of select ion issues in repartner ing 
as well as potent ial ant icipat ion effects. I ndeed, some studies emphasize 
that  repartner ing m ight  be a way to escape poverty (Dewilde and Uunk, 
2008) . We divide the sample into two subsamples of whether or not  
divorced women are already in a new relat ionship within the following year. 
For women who repartner just  after divorce, the type of custody 
arrangement  is no longer signif icant . Thus, whatever the custody 
arrangement , the probability of working is the same. However, for women 
not  yet  repartnered, the posit ive effect  of shared custody remains and is 
even more pronounced. We find heterogeneous effects that  are very sim ilar 
to those previously observed:  shared custody has larger posit ive effects for 
mothers with several children or with an infant  and those who belong to 
the lowest  income quint iles and are inact ive before divorce. The absence of 
effect  of custody arrangement  for repartnered women is interest ing. I t  
means that  repartner ing m ight  be a way for some women to not  only 
increase their  liv ing standards but  to also dim inish the work- fam ily t rade-
off thanks due to the presence of a stepfather who may take care of the 
children.  
 
5 .5  Robustness checks  
 
There is not  just  one way to define concepts such as employment  or 
inact ivity. To test  the robustness of our conclusions, we test  the sensit ivit y 
of our results to other definit ions of employment . Since our data do not  
provide a perfect  definit ion of em ploym ent , we have to make assumpt ions 
about  how to define it  from  the fiscal data. I n our benchmark est imates, 
we define it  by consider ing a yearly threshold corresponding to two 
m inimum  monthly wages (2,100 euros)  dur ing the year. We test  here 
alternat ive definit ions by stat ing the threshold of resources used to define 
employment  at  one, three and four m inimum  monthly wage amounts 
instead of two. The results presented in appendix A2 are very robust  to 
different  definit ions.  
 
6 . Discussion and conclusion 
 
An increasing t rend in both shared custody pract ises and the diversity of 
parents with shared custody arrangements is observed in many count r ies. 
I n the sharp debate about  whether or not  to promote shared custody 
arrangements, the main arguments put  forth concerns about  either the 
consequences for children in terms of cognit ive or behavioural 
development , or the equality between parents in terms of r ights for 
visitat ion and exercising their  parental responsibilit ies equally after divorce. 
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The impact  on labour market  outcomes for divorced parents is much less 
raised, although it  may const itute an important  factor in the discussion, as 
it  affects the liv ing standards and poverty r isk of all fam ily members.  
 
Here we analyse women’s labour force part icipat ion after divorce according 
to the prevailing child arrangements. Though a large proport ion of parents 
(one out  of five)  are now opt ing for shared custody in France, we st ill 
observe a posit ive socio-econom ic gradient  in shared custody prevalence. 
The probability  of being employed is 16 percentage points higher for 
mothers with shared custody arrangements compared to sole physical 
custody. There are huge heterogeneous effects in that  larger posit ive 
effects are observed for:  inact ive women, those belonging to the lowest  
income quint iles before divorce, those with a young child and those with 
three or more children. Shared custody is helpful for women who are far 
removed from the labour market . The high likelihood of re-enter ing the 
labour market  after divorce for mothers who were previously out  of the 
labour force is not  a new finding, but  the fact  that  having a shared custody 
arrangement  enlarges this effect  is a new and or iginal cont r ibut ion.  
 
I t  is interest ing to reframe this result  in light  of the policy against  poverty. 
To fight  against  poverty, several count r ies have int roduced cost ly welfare 
programs associated with ‘welfare to work’ and ‘make work pay’ policies, 
somet imes specifically target ing lone parents. Laws favour ing joint  custody 
and the increasing t rend in this pract ice are cost less and also have posit ive 
effects on divorced mothers’ labour market  outcomes. To what  extent  the 
regulat ion of shared custody m ight  be compared to welfare employment  
programs is a crucial public policy quest ion and it  should be ser iously 
considered. Even if child custody arrangements do not  fall within the scope 
of employment  policy, our research shows that  policies promot ing more 
equal sharing of parental responsibilit ies – such as those increasing shared 
custody arrangements – could have st rong effects on women’s financial 
autonomy, at  least  in the short  term , and they could also have potent ial 
long- term  effects on pension ent it lements.  
 
However our results on the posit ive effects of shared custody also show 
that  re-enter ing the labour market  after divorce is not  universal and is 
highly sensit ive to other factors. Results on subsam ples also emphasize the 
st rong financial const raints faced by mothers after divorce. A highly 
illust rat ive example can be found in the specific yet  quite common case of 
lone mothers who have their  children on a full- t ime basis and do not  receive 
any support  payments, whatever the reason. Because these mothers have 
to bear the ent irety of child costs, they are more act ive in the labour market  
than their  counterparts who have shared custody. This study confirms 
previous studies showing that  repartner ing may be a way for some women 
to escape these huge financial const raints and to reduce the work- fam ily 
imbalance.   
 
25 
 
Our study considers act ivity status one year after divorce. This is a short  
per iod for recovery and is a lim itat ion result ing from our  data. Nevertheless, 
we should expect  even st ronger effects over more t ime. Finding a job, 
especially for mothers who interrupted their  career before divorce and 
organizing for child care may take some t ime. A second data lim itat ion 
ar ises from the impossibilit y of ident ifying mothers who are looking for a 
job (without  having found one yet )  in case they do not  receive  
unemployment  allowances.  I t  is also difficult  to dist inguish part - t ime jobs 
with any precision.  
 
Finally, some specificat ion on the French context  can shed light  on our 
results and assess their  external validity. France is a fam ily-or iented 
count ry, where even mothers with young children work, m eaning that  this 
part icular count ry-specific environment  provides incent ives for mothers to 
work, with the childcare provision being quite generous. However, there is 
an educat ional gradient  in the female employment  rate, which is 
emphasized by recent  parental leave policies (Piket ty, 2005, Lequien, 2012, 
Joseph et  al.,  2013). Mothers belonging to the lowest  income quint iles are 
those more likely to quit  the labour market  after the bir th of a child, and to 
react  to new public policies. They were more likely to interrupt  their  careers 
after the extension of parental leave. Our results for divorced mothers also 
show that  mothers who are furthest  away from the labour market  are those 
for whom the type of custody arrangement  after divorce is the most  
important  and whose likelihood for employment  is more st rongly affected. 
However, instead of a decrease, we observe a higher likelihood of 
employment . This shows that  some specific populat ions react  more than 
others to either public policies or new fam ily arrangements. Shared custody 
in less fam ily- fr iendly count r ies is therefore likely to play even more of a 
role in a mother’s employment , since mothers benefit  from  less support  
from  public policies to balance work and fam ily dut ies;  in which case our 
results can be seen as lower bounds on the effect  that  shared custody has 
on employment . This must  be confirmed by replicat ing our  study in other 
count r ies however. Finally, another interest ing avenue of research would 
be to look further into the market  behaviours of fathers in relat ion to shared 
custody arrangements.  
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Appendix A1 -  Validity of the inst rum ent : Placebo test  
We direct ly regress our dependent  var iable (being employed)  on our 
inst rument  for two dist inct  samples:  our benchmark sam ple and the sample 
of childless women. This “ intent ion- to- t reat ”  regression allows us to see if 
the fract ion of shared custody has an effect  on childless women who, by 
definit ion, are not  concerned with shared custody. I f such were the case, it  
would pose a threat  to our ident ificat ion st rategy because that  would mean 
our inst rument  may be related to other factors influencing women’s 
employment . Table 6 clear ly shows that  our inst rument  has no significant  
effect  on childless women:  point  est im ates are between 2 and over 3 t imes 
lower than the one obtained for mothers, and they are non-significant  even 
though they are even more precisely est imated. As it  turns out , the 
proport ion of shared custody at  the department  level has a posit ive effect  
only on divorced m others.   
 
Table 6 : Placebo test  
  
Considered sample 
Mothers 
Placebo 
Childless women 
  All I nact ives All I nact ives 
Proport ion of 
shared custody  
0.202 
*  0.684*  0.149 0.226 
 
(0.114)  (0.388)  (0.119)   (0.417)   
Number of 
observat ions 61554 11799 19182 2656 
Note:  Cont rols include:  women’s age and squared age, PACS, income quint iles, 
ownership status, unemployment  rate and squared unemployment  rate, town size 
and previous act iv it y status ( for specificat ions on the whole sample)  and number 
of children and age of youngest  ( for specificat ions on the mothers’ sample) .  
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Appendix A2 : Aggregate level regression 
As suggest ive evidence of the exogeneity of our inst rument , we present  
here regressions at  the department  level of the rate of shared custody on 
a set  of local cont rols reflect ing the socioeconom ic and demographic 
character ist ics of the department . I ndeed, the share of shared custody may 
be influenced by age st ructure, econom ic situat ion, religiosity, work- fam ily 
balance possibilit ies, and divort iality .  We use the share of the act ive 
populat ion aged between 18 and 60 years old together with the rat io of old 
people over young people to account  for the populat ion st ructure. To take 
into account  the econom ic situat ion at  the department  level, we include the 
unemployment  rate as an indicator of local labour market  condit ions, the 
poverty rate and the (median)  level of income. We also include an indicator 
of the childcare supply that  may play both on the preference for childcare 
arrangement  and the mother’s employability . As fam ily norms may be 
important  to explain the level of shared custody, we include two indicators 
of religiosity:  the proport ion of Catholics and the proport ion of people in 
the department  declar ing that  they have no religion. 23 Finally, we include 
an indicator of divorce r isk. 
 
Only unem ployment  rate turns out  to have a signif icant  im pact  on the share 
of shared custody. As expected, unemployment  shows a negat ive im pact , 
thus highlight ing that  shared custody is more likely to be chosen in a 
department  where the level of employment  is higher. Thus, the local share 
of shared custody is explained only a lit t le by the econom ic and 
demographic st ructure or fam ily values. R squared is only 45% . There thus 
remains much unexplained var iabilit y that  cannot  be accounted for by the 
different  var iables. We definitely do not  claim  here that  our inst rument  fully  
explains the remaining var iability , but  it  clear ly rules out  the idea that  all 
the local condit ions we tested are the main determ inants of the local share 
of shared custody. We think that  the local “ judge/ lawyer effect ”  is an 
important  part  of the story and of this remaining unexplained var iability.  
 
 
  
                                    
23
  These figures are coded from the report  by I FOP 2006 “Eléments d'analyse 
géographique de l' implantat ion des religions en France” . 
ht tps: / / www.google.fr/ ur l?sa= t&rct= j&q= &esrc= s&source= web&cd= 1&ve
d= 0ahUKEwi36-
yJ9PzYAhWBWBQKHX8UBNwQFggnMAA&url= ht tp% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww.ifop.c
om% 2Fmedia% 2Fpoll% 2Freligions_geo.pdf&usg= AOvVaw1qYD3K_b_WXU
gtBw6aHGI H 
32 
 
Table 7 : Aggregate level regression on the share of shared 
custody  
in the departm ent  
Variables Coef. Std. Err.  
Age st ructure   
Rat io old(+ 65) / young(< 19)  people  0.064 0.040 
Proport ion of act ive populat ion 0.129 0.252 
Econom ic situat ion   
Unemployment  rate -0.012* *  0.003 
Median income  -0.000 0.000 
Poverty rate -0.003 0.002 
W ork- fam ily balance   
Childcare places per 100 children under 
3 
-0.000 0.000 
Religion   
%  of the populat ion feeling catholic 
( ref= 55-63% ) 
  
< = 54%  -0.006 0.011 
64-70%  -0.006 0.008 
71-75%  0.005 0.013 
> 75%  -0.008 0.014 
%  of the populat ion declar ing they have 
no religion ( ref= 20-27% ) 
  
< = 20%  -0.010 0.011 
27-34%  0.002 0.007 
> 34%  -0.004 0.011 
Divort ia lity    
Number of divorcees < 70 per 1000 marr ied people ( ref= [ 13-14[ )  
< 11 -0.006 0.009 
[ 11-13[  -0.007 0.008 
[ 14-15[  -0.001 0.009 
> = 15 0.011 0.009 
Constant  0.268 0.141 
R2 0.45 
N 95 
*  p< 0.05;  * *  p< 0.01 
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Appendix A3 : Different  definit ions of act ivity/ inact ivity 
The definit ion of act iv ity versus inact ivit y emanates from the annual 
income. The specificat ion used in this art icle adopts the annual threshold 
of two m inimum  monthly wages over the year (2,110 euros) . We t r ied here 
different  thresholds corresponding to one (1,055 euros) , three (3,165 
euros)  and four m inim um wages (4,220 euros) . The results are very 
sim ilar.   
 
Table 8 : Regressions using different  definit ions of 
act ivity/ inact ivity 
 (1)  basic (2)  (3)  
Threshold ( in Euros)  1,055 2,110 3,165 4,220 
Shared custody  1.425* * *  1.400* * *  1.376* * *  1.380* * *  
 (0.128)  (0.127)  (0.134)  (0.142)  
Num ber of children =  2 0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018)  
Num ber of children =  3 -0.073* * *  -0.112* * *  -0.111* * *  -0.120* * *  
 (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.024)  
Num ber of children =  4+  -0.232* * *  -0.274* * *  -0.283* * *  -0.297* * *  
 (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.037)  
Shared custody *  2 children 0.071 0.096* *  0.101* *  0.082*  
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048)  
Shared custody *  3 children 0.113 0.173* *  0.130*  0.126*  
 (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.068)  
Shared custody *  4+  children 0.311* * *  0.386* * *  0.330* * *  0.352* * *  
 (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.108)  (0.105)  
Household Incom e =  Q1 -0.352* * *  -0.375* * *  -0.380* * *  -0.396* * *  
 (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.033)  
Household Incom e =  Q2 -0.171* * *  -0.179* * *  -0.199* * *  -0.204* * *  
 (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.029)  
Household Incom e =  Q4 0.071* *  0.089* * *  0.099* * *  0.108* * *  
 (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)  
Household Incom e =  Q5 -0.053 -0.018 0.014 0.033 
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  
Shared custody *  Q1 0.265* * *  0.259* * *  0.265* * *  0.263* * *  
 (0.096)  (0.093)  (0.090)  (0.089)  
Shared custody *  Q2 0.043 0.058 0.082 0.064 
 (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.059)  
Shared custody *  Q4 0.029 0.011 0.028 -0.041 
 (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.072)  (0.066)  
Shared custody *  Q5 0.024 -0.022 -0.006 -0.043 
 (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.066)  
Em ployed  1.017* * *  1.031* * *  1.107* * *  1.133* * *  
 (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.042)  
Shared custody *  Em ployed -0.142* * *  -0.154* * *  -0.204* * *  -0.161* * *  
 (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.055)  
Age of youngest  child =  0-3 0.014 0.026 0.037* *  0.058* * *  
 (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  
Age of youngest  child =  13-17 0.108* * *  0.107* * *  0.115* * *  0.120* * *  
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Shared custody *  youngest  0-3 0.208* * *  0.169* * *  0.150* * *  0.139* * *  
 (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.052)  
Shared custody *  youngest  13-17 -0.090 -0.079 -0.105 -0.099*  
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 (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.055)  
PACS 0.092* *  0.089* *  0.087* *  0.092* *  
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.040)  
Age 0.060* * *  0.069* * *  0.072* * *  0.075* * *  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Age^ 2 -0.001* * *  -0.001* * *  -0.001* * *  -0.001* * *  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Owner 0.031 0.047* *  0.055* *  0.065* * *  
 (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
Unem p. Rate -0.040* * *  -0.035* *  -0.036* * *  -0.040* * *  
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  
Unem p. rate^ 2 0.002* * *  0.001* * *  0.001* * *  0.002* * *  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Town size =  2000-4999 0.030 0.021 0.010 0.011 
 (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029)  
Town size =  5000-9999 -0.026 -0.057*  -0.050 -0.032 
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.038)  
Town size =  10000-19999 -0.046 -0.062* *  -0.074* *  -0.055*  
 (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.029)  
Town size =  20000-49999 -0.066* *  -0.069* * *  -0.060* *  -0.064* *  
 (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  
Town size =  50000-99999 -0.038 -0.045 -0.041 -0.036 
 (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.029)  
Town size =  100000-199999 -0.110* *  -0.106* * *  -0.106* * *  -0.111* * *  
 (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.031)  
Town size =  > 200000 -0.039*  -0.031 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Town size =  Paris Area 0.100* * *  0.123* * *  0.127* * *  0.124* * *  
 (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.029)  
Constant  -0.838* * *  -1.125* * *  -1.265* * *  -1.418* * *  
 (0.211)  (0.203)  (0.216)  (0.208)  
     
Observat ions 61,554 61,554 61,554 61,554 
Robust  standard errors in parentheses, * * *  p< 0.01, * *  p< 0.05, *  p< 0.1 
